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Women 's Dilemma:
Is It Reasonable to be Rational?
See how they cling to the very chains which
bind them!
------Rhett Butler
There appear to be at least two important
disanalogies between the situation of women and that
of racial and ethnic minorities whose members are
generally regarded as paradigmatic victims of
oppression. First, in the case of oppressed racial and
ethnic minorities it is relatively easy to identify the op-
pressors and the policies which serve to keep the
oppressed in their place; it is not so easy to determine
who the oppressors of women are--surely men are not
universally blameworthy--nor even to ascertain which
policies are oppressive. Secondly, unlike most
members of disadvantaged racial and ethnic minorities,
many women seem actively to support the very policies
and institutions which contribute to their oppression.
I suggest that the difficulty in identifying the
oppressors of women arises because the whole picture
of women as members of a slave class, who regularly
act against their own interests because they are either
coerced or brainwashed by their oppressors, is
2- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
seriously misleading. Rather, in supporting traditional
sex roles women, as well as men, act as rational, self-
interested choosers whose choices, though intended to
optimize their chances of a good outcome, bring about
a state of affairs which is less than optimific for all
concerned. Women, in short, are caught in a game of
Prisoner's Dilemma, a game in which, paradoxically,
the result of everyone's free and rational choice is a
state of affairs which no player would freely or
rationally choose.
1. The Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma was discovered by
Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood of the RAND
Corporation in 1950 and given its now- famous name
by Albert W. Tucker who wrote the first of many
articles discussing the puzzle. The following
formulation of the problem is Hofstadter's
Imagine that you and an accomplice
(someone you have no feelings about one way
or the other) committed a crime, and now
you've both been apprehended and thrown in
jail, and are fearfully awaiting trials. You are
being held in separate cells with no way to
communicate. The prosecutor offers each of
you the following deal (and informs you both
that the identical deal is being offered to each of
you--and that you both know that as well!):
"We have a lot of circumstantial evidence on
you both. So if you both claim innocence, we
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will convict you anyway and you'll both get
two years in jail. But if you will help us out by
admitting your guilt and making it easier for us
to convict your accomplice ...we'lliet you out
free. And don't worry about revenge--your
accomplice will be in for five years! How about
it? Warily you ask, 'But what if we both say
we're guilty?' 'Ah, well, my friend--I'm afraid
you'll both get four-years sentences, then.'!
There's a certain poignancy about this case: if
you and your accomplice, each assuming the other to
be a rational egoist, behave in what would seem to be a
strictly rational and self-interested fashion and rat on
one another, you end up worse off than if you both
behave "illogically" and maintain your innocence. To
make this out, consider the payoff matrix for this










~- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In this case, -2, which you get if both you and
your accomplice stay mum, is called the reward for
mutual cooperation; -4 is the punishment for mutual
non-cooperation since this is what you get if each of
you rats on the other; for equally obvious reasons 0,
getting off scot free at the cost of implicating your
accomplice, is called the temptation; and -5, is the
sucker's payoff. Such are the four possible payoffs in
any version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. We could
easily have set up a prisoner's dilemma where the
numbers were different, but in any case of Prisoner's
Dilemma the following conditions must be met:
(1) temptation> reward> sucker's payoff
(2) (temptation + sucker's payoft)/2< reward
Note, the first condition insures that being
honorable is both more dangerous and less potentially
beneficial for you than being a jerk. The second
condition figures importantly in the iterated Prisoner's
dilemma to be discussed presently. It guarantees that
where the ultimate payoff depends upon a series of
decisions, each with its own payoff, the reward for
consistent cooperation will be greater than the payoff
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for alternately suckering and being suckered by your
opponent.
Now from the moral point of view (or at least
from the Utilitarian point of view, given the
assumption that the numbers in the matrix cash out as
negative hedons) the situation in which both of you
stay mum and thus reap the rewards of mutual
cooperation is the most desirable state of affairs. As a
rational egoist however your aim is not to maximize
overall utility but to maximize your own utility and,
since you assume your accomplice is similarly
motivated, you have no compelling reason to think he
will stay mum. If however he sings and you stay mum
then you get five years, the maximum penalty, together
with the frustration of seeing him get off scot free.
Prudence therefore requires you to sing, and since
your accomplice is in the very same position, this is
true of him also. But irony of ironies: in this situation
being honorable would have been more prudent for
you both than being prudent! The best laid plans fail:
each of you gets four years.
Isn't life like that? Indeed, says Hofstadter: the
Prisoner's Dilemma is a "very lifelike paradox"--
particularly if we consider it in its most virulent iterated
form, in which a player engages in repeated trials either
with the same opponent or with a number of
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opponents. Even if being honorable and trusting were
the best policy to adopt in a single trial, it is not so
clear that such a policy would be to your advantage in
repeated trials, particularly in repeated trials with the
same adversary. Wouldn't your opponent discover that
you were a patsy and exploit your niceness in order to
get the biggest payoff for himself? Shouldn't you make
some attempt to keep your opponent guessing? And
shouldn't you try to take advantage of him if he proves
to be reasonably nice?
According to Hofstadter you should not. The
peculiar feature of Prisoner's Dilemma, especially
salient when we consider its iterated version, is that
even if isolated nastiness or "defection" is better for
you than isolated niceness or "cooperation,"
widespread cooperation turns out to be better for
everyone, including you, than widespread defection.
Given the assumption that all players are likely to make
the same decision (since by hypothesis they are all
equally rational, equally informed and equally egoistic)
cooperation turns out to be the best strategy in one-shot
cases, and in iterated cases strategies which are highly
(though not maximally) cooperative, or "nice," turn out
to be the overall winners.
Interestingly, this result was proven (at least to
Hofstadter's satisfaction) by a computer tournament
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conducted by Robert Axelrod, a political scientist
investigating the evolution of cooperation in a world of
rational egoists.2 Pitting computer programs which
embodied strategies for coping with Prisoner's
Dilemma against one another in a number of trials--
including an "ecological tournament" in which "fit"
programs were multiplied while the "unfit" were
removed from the "environment"--the overall winner
turned out to be a relatively "nice" program named TIT
FOR TAT. TIT FOR TAT's strategy was exceedingly
simple: cooperate on move 1; thereafter do whatever
the other player did on the previous move. Speaking
anthropomorphically, TIT FOR TAT (and most other
programs which did well in Axelrod's tournaments)
had the properties of being nice, provokable, forgiving
and clear: that is to say it started by cooperating and did
not defect unless provoked. If provoked however it
responded immediately by retaliating in proportion and
its policy, being simple, could easily be discerned by
its opponents.
The implications of these results for
evolutionary theory are striking: we have only to
imagine a number of primitive organisms swimming in
a primordial soup, occasionally interacting according to
the strategies modeled by Axelrod's programs in the
"ecological" tournament, to see the explanatory power
f3- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
of this thesis. Furthermore, as should be apparent, the
results show that we need not invoke divine guidance,
moral sense or even intelligence to explain the
evolution of cooperation. The programs that played in
Axelrod's tournaments were all pretty dumb.3 The
tournaments were therefore excellent models for the
"rational" behavior of primitive organisms.
In fact, it turns out that faced with Prisoner's
Dilemma situations, more complex organisms behave
less "rationally" than bacteria or simple programs in
BASIC. Hofstadter, for example, set up a (one-shot)
prisoner's dilemma situation for 20 of his most rational
friends and the defectors outnumbered the cooperators
14 to 6.4 (Of special interest to philosophers, Daniel
Dennett, a well-known philosopher of mind, was
included in the sample and he cooperated!) Worse,
results like this seem to hold not only in artificial
situations, such as this and other mind-games
contrived by Hofstadter and others, but in real life.
What would happen if there was a war--or a traffic
jam, or a run on a bank--and no one came? What
would happen if concentration camp inmates who
greatly outnumbered their captors had stampeded
guards who led them to the ovens? And what would
happen if women, who constitute the majority the
-----------------------9
population and, at least in America, control most of the
wealth, were to go on strike?
2. Women's Dilemma
In real life, the satisfactions for which we play
and the evils we hope to avoid, are many and varied.
Not all the decisions which confront women are
Prisoner's Dilemmas nor is women's support of op-
pressive policies and institutions invariably motivated
by a jaundiced view of other women and a desire to
avoid being suckered. Sometimes women are forced
to comply with sexist demands and sometimes women
comply because they have "internalized" popular
wisdom about which attitudes and actions are
appropriate to women, in particular because
compliance in and of itself is regarded as appropriate
and asserting one's rights inappropriate. Much of the
time however I would suggest that women comply
because we are every bit as aggressive, cynical and
competitive as men, because we are tempted to get the
big payoff and because we are afraid of being
suckered.
Consider, for example, the following game of
Prisoner's Dilemma which women frequently play:
Snagging A Man. Most women have an interest in
attracting men. First, most women are heterosexual
and therefore need to acquire men for sexual purposes.
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Secondly, and more importantly, given massive
discrimination in hiring and promotion, most women
need men for economic reasons. A woman's ability to
snag a man however is directly proportional to her
attractiveness. The slimmer and prettier a woman is,
the easier it is for her to trap a high-quality, high-
yielding man; plain women must make do with the
rejects and may, if they are too picky, end up out in the
cold completely.
Now within limits a woman can improve her
appearance and thus her chances of snagging the man
of her choice: she can diet, do aerobics, bleach her
hair, have plastic surgery if necessary, pass her leisure
time under a sunlamp, curl her eyelashes, invest in
acrylic fingernails and spend the bulk of her income on
clothes and cosmetics. Still, in the words of our
mothers, "beauty hurts." A woman who wants to
improve her appearance appreciably must exercise an
enormous amount of effort and spend the better part of
her days in profound and distracting discomfort,
wearing constricting clothing, itchy panty hose and
painful shoes.
Most women, in fact, do take pains to be
attractive and well-dressed because they know full well
that if their appearance is well below average they will
lose out in the meat market. In the past, married
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women could "let themselves go" but now, as the
divorce rate tops 50 percent, married women know that
they can easily be dumped. There is no safety net, no
end to the competition and no end to the pain.
Furthermore, women know that if they are prettier than
the average they are in a very strong position indeed:
men compete for the most attractive women so an
exceptionally pretty woman has a large selection of
suitors from which to choose and, even better, is in the
position to strike a hard bargain with the man she
finally accepts.
Now if all, or most, women decided to "let
themselves go" life would be much better for all
women. If we all went off our perpetual diets, burnt
our panty hose and spent the remainder of our lives in
jeans and sweatshirts we would be more comfortable
and we would still get the sexual and economic goods
since men would be forced to put up with our
slovenliness. If Hofstadter's analysis is correct the
solution is obvious: we should form a compact in
order to reap the rewards of universal sloppiness.
This situation is a Prisoner's Dilemma. If we
"cooperate" (with our sisters) in order to bring down
the dress code we reap the reward for mutual co-
operation; if most of us defect--as we in fact have--we
get the punishment for mutual defection (panty hose
12- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
forever). If however some of us cooperate and others
defect then the defectors, having succumbed to the
temptation to get one up on their sisters, get their pick
of men and do very well indeed while those who
cooperate get the sucker's payoff and end up as old
maids.
This case is illustrative of a more global
phenomenon: women's business is the business of
pleasing people. Hard work, intelligence and technical
competence are not nearly so likely to payoff for
women as are good grooming, social skills and
niceness. A woman achieves success by exhibiting to
a high degree qualities that oil the social machinery and
make other people feel good. Thus a women gets a
much bigger payoff from being compliant, compas-
sionate, cheerful, and generally pleasant than a man
does. It is not that women have a greater psychological
need for "connectedness" or get more intrinsic
satisfaction from being liked (and more dissatisfaction
from being disliked) than men; rather, for women more
extrinsic satisfactions hang on being likable. For a
man, a winning smile and pleasant manner may be a
plus; for a woman such qualities are a necessity since
most women literally earn their liv~ng by pleasing
people, particularly men.
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Ironically, women compete with one another,
and compete quite fiercely, to be the most compliant,
the most apparently cooperative (with those whose
approval they seek to win), the nicest and least
aggressive. Indeed, this sort of competitiveness is
rarely recognized for what it is. Thus contemporary
writers tout men's alleged "aggression advantage" or,
in a feminist vein, women's greater capacity for
"connectedness" and for finding "inclusive" solutions
to problems. I suggest that such conclusions result
from a failure to be clear about what should count as
aggression, as competitiveness or as cooperation. We
should recognize that, ironically, the efforts of
traditionally "feminine" women to outdo one another in
"niceness" are competitive, aggressive and non-nice in
the highest degree. We should take seriously old-
fashioned metaphors about women donning their "war
paint" and going out "dressed to kill." Thus, I suggest
that women--like politicians who promote the arms
race, motorists who drive offensively, and other
victims of their own cynicism and competitiveness--
have become locked into something close to an "All-D"
(all defection) strategy in the game of iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma.
The pressure on women to take extreme care
with dress and appearance is not the only sexist
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pressure on women or the most important. Consider
the situation of women who work outside the home.
The overwhelming majority of women in the labor
force are still employed in traditionally female
occupations which are boring and underpaid. In
addition, as most women know, such positions offer
little chance for advancement. Women still make, on
the average, less than two thirds of what their male
counterparts earn--a figure which has not changed
appreciably in the past twenty years. Discrimination
against women in hiring and promotion remains the
norm and sex segregation in the labor force is the rule
rather than the exception. In such circumstances, it
does not pay women to invest too heavily in their
careers. Men's earning potential and prospects are
more promising than women's. Hence, where
resources are limited, a rational woman will invest in
marriage and in her husband's career in preference to
her own because this strategy is likely to have the
better payoff for her as well as for him.
This too is a Prisoner's Dilemma. One
important reason that employers, who are, by and
large, rational self-interested choosers, are reluctant to
invest in women is that women, on the average, invest
less in work than men; women, for their part, do not
invest heavily in work because they know that their
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employers are not likely to invest in them. This
"feedback effect" is well-known to economists who
note that if sex differences in the treatment of equally
qualified men and women are widespread and
persistent, the behavior of women themselves may be
adverselyaffected:
Productivity differences among
workers reflect, in part, the decisions they
make whether or not to continue their
schooling, participate in a training program,
remain continuously in the labor market, etc.
Faced with discrimination against them in the
labor market, women may have less incentive
to undertake such human capital investments. If
such indirect or feedback effects of labor
market discrimination exist, they are also
expected to lower the economic status of
women relative to men.
As Kenneth Arrow has pointed out, the
consequences of statistical discrimination are
particularlypernicious where there are feedback
effects. For example, if employers' views of
female job instability lead them to give women
less form-specific training and to assign them
to jobs where the costs of turnover are
minimized, women have little incentive to stay
and may respond by exhibiting exactly the
unstable behavior that employers expect.
Employers' perceptions are confirmed, and
they see no reason to change their
discriminatory behavior. Yet, if employers had
believed women to be stable workers and had
hired them into positions that rewarded such
stability, they might well have been stable
workers! Hence, where statistical
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discrimination is accompanied by feedback
effects, even employer behavior that is based
on initially incorrect assessments of average
sex differences may persist in the long run and
be fairly impervious to competitive pressures.
Some indication that such feedback
effects, essentially self-fulfilling prophecies,
are important is provided by studies of male
and female "quit" behavior. On average women
are indeed more likely to quit their jobs than
men. However, most of this difference is
explained by the types of jobs women are in.
The evidence suggests that among both blacks
and whites when a women worker is
confronted with the same incentives to remain
on the job in terms of wages, advancement
opportunities, etc., she is no more likely to quit
than a comparable male worker5
Women's rational, self-interested choices to
invest less in work help to perpetuate discrimination,
which is detrimental to the interests of all women. Yet
because minority cooperation results in cooperators
being suckered it is exceedingly difficult to break the
feedback loop. If a few isolated women, in the
interests of solidarity with their sisters--cooperators in
the game--invest more in work they are suckers: they
will miss out on the benefits they could otherwise have
gotten and, since they are in the minority, they will be
written off as exceptions or cranks. Discrimination
will continue unabated. On the other hand defectors,
women who without any thought for sisterly
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solidarity, invest less in their careers, gain.
Furthermore, as noted above, employers too would
gain if they invested more in women; but most regard
this, which some justification, as risky investment.
Probability is the guide to life and, as rational choosers
all that we can do is play the odds.
The result of such rational choices however is a
state of affairs in which everyone is worse off than he
or she would be if they behaved "irrationally," even at
the risk of being massively suckered. Paradoxically, in
such circumstances, rational choosers should prefer a
state of affairs in which everyone behaved
"irrationally": this being the case we might well ask
whether it is reasonable for women--or men--to be
rational.6
3. Why?
Why do rational, highly-evolved beings pursue
strategies which are ultimately unreasonable?
Hofstadter's suggestion IS, I think,
illuminating. To understand the Prisoner's Dilemma
puzzle we have to take seriously the stipulation that all
players are equally rational, equally well-informed, and
similarly motivated; in other words we must assume
that we are typical players so that our own actions are
indicative of what others will do. In Prisoner's
Dilemma it is what Hofstadter calls the "hope for
18- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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asymmetry"--the hope that players will not behave
uniformly--that induces players to defect. If we
recognized that we are more or less like other people
and gave others credit for being as rational as we were
we would recognize that this hope is in vain and the
temptation to get one up on our fellows by defecting
would disappear. Alas, we are all sturdy individualists
and cherish the secret hope that others are not so
clever, or so nice, as we are: this is what leads to our
downfall.
This diagnosis, so far as it goes, seems correct
and is clearly applicable to the courtship game.
Women may play dumb but few women, however
unliberated or unsympathetic to the aims of the
women's movement, really believe that they are dumb.
Many women however believe that other women are
dumb and that they themselves, for some inexplicable
reason, are uniquely rational. Perhaps more
importantly, most women do not know that they are
playing prisoner's dilemma. Their ignorance is
advantageous: in the people-pleasing game, self-
deception facilitates one's performance. A cynical
women who recognizes her situation as a Prisoner's
Dilemma and consciously sets out to snag a high-
yielding man in order to optimize her chances of a
favorable economic outcome is less likely to snag a
fmancially promising man than one who believes that
her only consideration is True Love.
There is however a more pessimistic conjecture
that might explain the persistence of self-defeating
strategies of defection. By hypothesis players of
Prisoner's Dilemma attempt to maximize their own
gain in an absolute sense: they are not motivated by an
interest in winning, that is, in getting one up on other
players, except insofar as this may be conducive to
increasing their gain in an absolute sense.
In real life however people are not like this.
They regularly exult in Pyrrhic victories and strive to
gain prestige for its own sake, even where the cost of
being one up is great in absolute terms. The big fish
eat the little fish, and the little fish eat even littler fish:
even fish who know that this brutally competitive
system makes it likely that they will get eaten support it
because the satisfaction they get from eating littler fish
is so great that it outweighs their fear of being eaten
themselves. Even if women could be convinced that
we would all be better off if we called a halt to the
competition to be nicer, more pleasant, better groomed
and more attractive than most of our peers we might
still continue with the game just in order to get one up.
In any case, whatever the explanation for
women's having adopted a non-cooperative strategy,
~()- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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my suggestion is that our motives for having adopted
this strategy are the same as the motives of
overwhelmingly male political leaders who play the
game of nuclear brinkmanship and motorists of both
sexes who indulge in rude and childish behavior on the
road. Only the circumstances and the payoffs are
different. On my account, women are neither forced to
comply with sexist demands nor are they
"brainwashed" into supporting sexist policies and
institutions. Women as a class are neither cowardly
nor stupid. We are moved by the same competitive,
individualistic and cynical assumptions that motivate
men and we reap similar questionable rewards.
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60n the account suggested here, traditional sex roles,
both in the labor force and in the private sphere,
represent suboptimal equilibria into which men and
women have become locked. For a brief discussion
of optimal and suboptimal equilibria, see Guillen,
pp. 149ff. W. Brian Arthur discusses
multiequilibrium systems responsive to positive
feedbacks and subject to suboptimal lock-in at greater
length in "Positive Feedbacks in the Economy."
These phenomena are discussed at a more technical
level by Arthur and other contributors to the
Anderson, Arthur and Pine anthology.
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